Myanmar’s case: How is a military coup still possible?

Some weeks ago, former US President Donald Trump made serious accusations of irregularities during the election process in some states in which President-elect Joe Biden was ahead in the vote count. Although Trump’s claims were proven false as there is no legitimate evidence, his supporters assaulted the Capitol building seeking an “electoral justice”.

As we all know, these pro-Trump riots didn´t succeed since they were trying to overturn a fraud that only existed in their minds (as well as in their leader’s). But even if these went further, they would have crashed with the walls of a firmly-established institution in one of the most ancient democracies, which shows no sign of authorities restricting the governing power of elected officials.

Now, what happens if we repeat the same formula in a different scenario? What if this kind of unsubstantiated electoral claims are made by authorities that keep reserved domains in a regime that has democratic and military authoritarian traits? Well, this is the case of Myanmar, a country where although democratic elements such as general elections and political parties are present, the armed forces possess institutionalized powers and a “tutelary authority” that restricts the democratic sphere.

Regarding the 2020 Myanmar general elections, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’ armed forces) claimed (without evidence) irregularities in the electoral process. Additionally, Myanmar's military-backed party, the Union of Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), claimed the same. In other words, they didn’t acknowledge the overwhelming victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD), even though international organizations such as the Human Rights Watch confirmed fair elections. So, as mentioned previously, due to their involvement in politics and all the power they count with, the next step for the Tatmadaw was pretty clear: carrying out a coup d'état.

But how is a military coup still possible today? Especially considering that the end of the Cold War, the third wave of democratization and the hegemony of liberal democracy created unfavorable conditions for military coups in the twenty-first century. The literature about military coup d'état's raises two main factors for this accomplishment. From a structural approach, weakness of democratic institutions creates a predisposition for the military’s activism, as well as leadership issues. Moreover, civilian government failure on dealing with major social or economic issues makes groups like the military to become politicized and fill out a power vacuum.

Additionally, the literature points out that the triumphs of military coup d'états have to do with a legitimacy of such an action. This legitimacy depends on the political culture of the country; in other words, depends on unwritten laws and values that guide the society’s behavior. If a country has a low democratic political culture or one that leans more towards an authoritarian one, then it is much more vulnerable to direct military intervention since there is collective consensus to justify this action.

This might explain several extreme actions carried out by militaries worldwide, even during the post-Cold War era; nevertheless, this doesn’t accurately fit in Myanmar’s case due to its particularity. Firstly, although Myanmar has weak democratic institutions that give a free path for the military to carry out a coup, and disregarding the relative youthfulness of these institutions, these are not likely to attach to democratic norms and practices because of the controversial 2008 Constitution: a legacy of military juntas that ruled for almost fifty years in Myanmar.

The 2008 Constitution establishes a power-sharing dynamic between the civilian actors and the Tatmadaw. It also allows a tutelary authority that ensures a leadership role for the military (the legislative and executive branches are under their control). Furthermore, the Magna Carta gives a quarter of parliamentary seats to the military and to security-related ministers. In that way, it’s impossible to consolidate a liberal democratic regime when the armed forces are autonomous and escape from civilian control. As a matter of fact, Myanmar cannot be considered a democratic regime nor a military one, it should be seen as a hybrid regime that maintains characteristics of both.

We can´t say that the military became politicized due to the absence of effective democratic institutions, because they were already in power and have a constitution specifically established to safeguard the military’s interests and to keep their independent position inside the government by wielding veto powers or reserved domains. The military does not need to become politicized since, although it does not rule directly, they have played a key role when decisions had to be done.

Secondly, the literature about military coups suggests that these types of actions have to count with a legitimacy that depends on the political culture of the society. In the case of Myanmar, it is very reasonable to say that most of the people have an authoritarian political culture because they have lived so many years under the government of the armed forces that they are likely to develop a system of beliefs and an ideological core based on good things that the regime had brought to them. In the same tone, we could say that the military coup had legitimacy because the people’s political culture allowed it.

However, the reality has shown us a different landscape. After the military coup d'état, the most common reaction in Myanmar has been anger. In some regions of the country like in Yangon, this collective anger has turned into massive pro-democratic protests from people of different ages, ethnicities and social positions. “I don't want the coup. I have seen many transitions in this country and I was looking forward to a better future”, declared a 64-year-old resident of the Hlaing township. This is a clear example of what people are fighting for: they want to defend democracy, defend the legitimate election result that Aung San Suu Kyi's party won, and defend their rights. Currently, many things in Myanmar are unclear, but the protests have shown us that the democratic political cultural is not one of those.

As a conclusion, the triumphs of a military coup depend on structural and cultural factors. But, when we are referring to a hybrid regime with tutelary powers or reserved domains thing gets a little more complicated, just like the case of Myanmar. Before the 2021 military coup, armed forces already had strong political powers, and the autonomy that allowed them to overtake the democratic institutions. So, bearing this information in mind, I can tell that these aspects widen the analysis field in understand how a military coup d'état is still possible in the twenty-first century.